Implementation of the CHT Accord. The GoB and PCJSS signed the CHT Accord in 1997 which was mostly seen from a power devolution perspective by most, if not all, scholars. Xxxxxxxxxxx (2012) attempted to focus on power-sharing between the center and periphery, mostly from a human rights perspective. This study neither examined power- sharing formula in detail nor substantiated from the accord implementation perspective. Xxxxxx (2008) argued that the Accord was flawed since it failed to address some core factors including identity, land, Bengali settlement and military withdrawal issues. Although the elites were aware about this political accord and its contents, grassroots people of the CHT have “extremely inadequate knowledge” about them plausibly due to lack of intensive discussion with local people, covert peace negotiation process etc. (Barkat, 2009:14). Some authors argued that the issue of non- or partial-implementation of the Accord was a key challenge of peace in the CHT (Xxxxxx, 2003; Xxxxxx, 2003; Xxx, 2007; Chakma, 2010; Xxxxx, 2012; Khan, 2010; Islam and Xxxxxx, 2013). The main concern of such an argument was related to an elusive construction of the Accord (Xxxxxx, 2003; Xxxxxx, 2008; Xxxxxx et al. 2013). This inadequate accord implementation created a “more complex and volatile” situation that was mirrored with mistrust, suspicion and misunderstanding between parties (Islam and Chakma, 2013). Surprisingly, none of these studies provided a detailed analysis of the CHT accord implementation. Xxx (2007, 2012) identified some stumbling blocks of this process including intra- and inter-ethnic group conflict and violence, ‘degovernmentalisation’ of the CHT institutions and concerns of human rights. Xxxxxx and D’Costa (2013) argued that militarization generated a fear and reproduced violence, and thus contributed to “’violent peace’”, as security forces were the “de-facto” rulers of the CHT (Xxxxx, 2013:284). Although security forces had less interest in intervening politics since democracy returned in Bangladesh, there was an uneasy trend of accommodating them in politics due to implicit weaknesses of democratic process (Xxxxxx, 2001). The politicization of CHT institutions by subsequent governments was identified in several studies as the main stumbling block of making the HDCs and RC functional (Islam, 2011; Xxxxxxxxx, 2012:70-71; Xxxxxx et al. 2013; Xxx, 2012; Islam, 2016b). These studies did not address in sufficient detail the complexity associated to holding elections of these...
